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THREE CHALLENGES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL 
ANTITRUST 
Michael A. Carrier* 
Pharmaceutical antitrust law is hard.  When drug companies delay 
generic entry, is that beneficial “life-cycle management”?  Or is it 
unjustified anti-competitive behavior?  The question arises in multiple 
settings, including patent settlements by which brand firms pay generics 
to delay entering the market, product reformulations made to prevent 
generic adoption, citizen petitions filed with the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the denial of samples that generics need to 
enter the market. 
Courts confront challenges when addressing these complex 
questions.  And sometimes, they veer astray.  Why?  This essay seeks to 
answer that question, cataloging three mistakes courts have made in this 
setting, which are based on (1) complexity, (2) simplicity, and (3) 
Sisyphus. 
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Pharmaceutical antitrust law is hard.  When drug companies delay 
generic entry, is that beneficial “life-cycle management”?  Or is it 
unjustified anti-competitive behavior?  The question arises in multiple 
settings, including patent settlements by which brand firms pay generics 
to delay entering the market, product reformulations made to prevent 
generic adoption, citizen petitions filed with the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and the denial of samples generics need to enter 
the market. 
Courts confront challenges when addressing these complex 
questions.  And sometimes, they veer astray.  Why?  This essay seeks to 
answer that question, cataloging three mistakes courts have made in this 
setting, which are based on (1) complexity, (2) simplicity, and (3) 
Sisyphus. 
I. COMPLEXITY 
First, the pharmaceutical industry is unique in its complexity, with 
nuanced markets and multiple regulatory regimes. 
A. Markets 
Pharmaceutical markets are complex.  Unlike other markets, “the 
consumer who pays does not choose, and the physician who chooses 
does not pay.”1  This disconnect has created a gap that can be exploited.  
Brand firms can convince doctors to prescribe expensive drugs even if 
equally effective cheaper drugs are available.  In fact, brands have done 
so through an array of activity that includes samples, mailings, detailing 
(sales calls to doctor’s offices), sponsored continuing medical education 
programs, and advertising in media and medical journals.2 
This range of activity entails significant expenditures, with brands 
often spending more on marketing than on research and development 
(R&D).3  And it has been effective.  Just to give one example, nearly half 
the doctors in one study considered information provided by sales 
representatives important and almost one-third changed their prescribing 
behavior as a result.4  At the same time, adding another layer of 
complexity, drug firms have increased direct-to-consumer advertising, 
 
 1. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION: STAFF REPORT 
TO THE F.T.C. 2 (Jan. 1979). 
 2. STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 87-93 (2d 
ed. 2007). 
 3. E.g., id. at 82; Ana Swanson, Big Pharmaceutical Companies are Spending Far 
More on Marketing than Research, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2015. 
 4. SCHWEITZER, supra note 2, at 85. 
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which has resulted in doctors acceding to patients’ wishes and writing 
more prescriptions.5 
B. Regulatory regime 
In addition to complex markets, the pharmaceutical industry is 
characterized by a complicated regulatory regime consisting of patent 
law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws. 
First is the patent system.  The pharmaceutical industry and its 
advocates famously trumpeted the costs of bringing a drug to market and 
its need for patents.6  In “product-hopping” cases (in which the brand 
firm switches from one version of a drug to another just to stifle generic 
entry), brands highlight the benefits of their (often patented) 
reformulated drugs.7  And in cases in which brands settle patent 
infringement litigation by paying generics to delay entering the market, 
the brands seek to highlight the strength of their patents.8 
The second aspect of the regulatory regime is the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, Congress’s calibration of the patent and antitrust laws in the 
pharmaceutical industry.9  The Act fostered innovation through patent 
term extensions, periods of market exclusivity not based on patents, and 
an automatic 30-month stay of generic approval.10  The Act also 
increased generic competition by allowing experimentation on a drug 
during the patent term, letting generics rely on brands’ safety and 
effectiveness studies, and providing 180 days of marketing exclusivity 
to the first generic (known as a “Paragraph IV filer”) to challenge a brand 
firm’s patent.11 
Third are state drug product selection laws, which are in effect in 
all 50 states and are designed to lower prices to consumers.12  Absent a 
doctor’s contrary instructions, these laws allow (and in some cases 
 
 5. Id. at 98-99; see also Chloe Reichel, Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising Spikes 
Demand, BUSINESS ETHICS, May 8, 2018, https://www.business-
ethics.com/2018/05/08/direct-to-consumer-drug-advertising-spikes-demand/. 
 6. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: New 
estimates of R&D costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 31 (2016) ($2.6 billion to bring drug to 
market in 2013). 
 7. See, e.g., In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 8. E.g., King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-1797, 2015 WL 
6750899, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2015) (finding that evidence relating to patent could be 
considered when the alleged purpose was “to demonstrate that a reasonable litigant could have 
believed the patent to be valid at the time of the reverse-payment settlements.”). 
 9. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355). 
 10. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 43-45 (2009). 
 11. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 12. Norman V. Carroll et al., The Effects of Differences in State Drug Product Selection 
Laws on Pharmacists’ Substitution Behavior, 25 MED. CARE 1069, 1069-70 (1987). 
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require) pharmacists to substitute generic versions of brand drugs.13  The 
laws address the disconnect between prescribing doctors who are not 
responsive to price and paying insurers and consumers who do not select 
the drug.14  In particular, they carve out a role for pharmacies, which 
vigorously compete on price with other pharmacies and which enjoy 
higher margins on generic drugs.15 
II. SIMPLICITY 
One way courts have dealt with complex markets and regulatory 
regimes is by applying simple frameworks.  Courts have full dockets, 
pharmaceutical antitrust cases are complicated, and rather than engage 
in what could lead to the outcome most consistent with the regulatory 
regime’s goals, courts sometimes resort to approaches that lead to quick 
resolutions.  Four such approaches focus on an encouragement of 
settlement, a patent’s presumptive validity, the number of products on 
the market, and the size of the generic firm.  The first two approaches 
were prevalent in the decade before the Supreme Court rejected them in 
2013 in FTC v. Actavis.16  The latter two have not been overturned. 
A. Settlement 
The first simple framework courts adopted, in the context of 
settlements of patent litigation, was based on a general policy in favor of 
settlement.  Courts before Actavis recognized that settlements conserve 
resources, provide certainty that encourages investment, and result in 
licenses increasing competition.17  These courts also noted that 
settlements were particularly beneficial for patent litigation, which is 
lengthy, complex, and costly.18  For these reasons, the court in In re 
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation explained that “ ‘ courts are bound 
to encourage’ . . . settlement[s].”19  The court in Schering-Plough Corp. 
v. FTC found that “[t]he general policy of the law is to favor the 
settlement of litigation” and that “the policy extends to the settlement of 
 
 13. Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The 
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2010). 
 14. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 1. 
 15. Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 13-15 (2009). 
 16. 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
 17. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 36 F.T.C. 956, 999-1003 (2003), vacated, 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (1995). 
 18. In 2017, patent litigation in which there was more than $25 million at risk cost on 
average $3 million. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 41 (2017). 
 19. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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patent infringement suits.”20  And the court in In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation highlighted the “long-standing policy 
in the law in favor of settlements, [which] extends to patent infringement 
litigation.”21 
In the crucial Actavis decision, the Supreme Court appropriately did 
not immunize settlements from antitrust scrutiny.  In particular, it 
provided five reasons why the “general legal policy favoring the 
settlement of disputes” did not displace ordinary antitrust analysis.22 
First, the Court emphasized that settlements have the “potential for 
genuine adverse effects on competition,” explaining that “[t]he payment 
in effect amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to 
sell its product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent 
litigation were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not 
infringed by the generic product.”23  Second, the Court noted that the 
“anticompetitive consequences” of reverse-payment24 settlements would 
“sometimes prove unjustified.”25  Third, the Court linked the size of the 
payment to market power: “where a reverse payment threatens to work 
unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power 
to bring that harm about in practice.”26  Fourth, the Court explained that 
“an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than 
the [court below] believed.”27  And fifth, the Court noted that its rule 
“does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit,” as “[t]hey 
may, as in other industries, settle in other ways, for example by allowing 
the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market prior to the 
patent’s expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay 
out prior to that point.”28 
In conclusion, the Court synthesized, five considerations, “taken 
together, outweigh the single strong consideration—the desirability of 
settlements—that led the [court below] to provide near-automatic 
antitrust immunity to reverse payment settlements.”29 
 
 20. 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 21. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 22. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 153-58. 
 23. Id. at 153-54. 
 24. These are called “reverse payments” because the consideration flows from patentee 
to alleged infringer (unlike typical settlements in which alleged infringers pay patentees). 
 25. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156. 
 26. Id. at 157. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 158. 
 29. Id. 
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B. Presumptive validity 
The second simplistic framework that courts before Actavis applied 
upheld settlements based on a presumption of patent validity.  Section 
282 of the Patent Act states that patents “shall be presumed valid.”30  
Courts relied on this presumption as a starting point in ascertaining the 
validity crucial to determining the appropriate antitrust treatment.31  A 
settlement that allows generic entry before the end of the term of a valid 
patent promises to accelerate competition.  In contrast, if the patent were 
invalid, a settlement delaying entry beyond the date the generic could 
have entered could allow the firms to divide the market, with the brand 
obtaining the assurance that generic entry will be delayed and the generic 
getting the certainty of knowing it will receive payment.32 
For reasons similar to the rejection of the scope-of-the-patent test 
articulated below, the Court in Actavis appropriately recognized that 
“[t]he patent . . . may or may not be valid, and may or may not be 
infringed” and that “an invalidated patent carries with it no . . . right . . . 
[to] permit the patent owner to charge a higher than competitive price 
for the patented product.”33  In other words, a patent cannot conclusively 
be presumed to be valid.  It must be shown to be so.  That makes sense 
since the Patent Act’s presumption of validity (1) is only a procedural 
evidentiary presumption; (2) should be entitled to the least amount of 
deference in situations in which the parties enter agreements that prevent 
validity from even being challenged; (3) is undermined by the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s encouragement of invalidity challenges; and (4) is 
questioned by empirical studies that have shown that a significant 
percentage of granted patents are invalid.34 
C. Number of products 
The third example of a simplistic approach is based on courts’ 
assessment of the number of products involved.  The case of Walgreen 
v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, which involved AstraZeneca’s 
conversion from heartburn drug Prilosec to Nexium, is instructive.35  The 
plaintiffs alleged that there was “almost no difference” between the 
drugs and there was “no pharmacodynamic reason” the two forms would 
have different effects in the body.36  The plaintiffs also alleged that 
AstraZeneca “aggressively promoted and ‘detailed’ Nexium to doctors” 
 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). 
 31. See Carrier, supra note 10, at 62. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147 (emphasis in original). 
 34. Carrier, supra note 10, at 64-65. 
 35. 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 36. Id. at 149. 
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while stopping its promotion and detailing of Prilosec.37  And they 
claimed that AstraZeneca was able to switch the market (to a barely 
different reformulation receiving patent protection for an additional 13 
years) only through “distortion and misdirection in marketing, 
promoting and detailing Nexium.”38 
The court ignored the plaintiffs’ detailed allegations of the price 
disconnect (by which the doctor who prescribes the product does not pay 
for it, and the consumer [or her insurer] who pays for it, does not choose 
it).  The court granted AstraZeneca’s motion to dismiss, concluding that 
“there is no allegation that AstraZeneca eliminated any consumer 
choices.”39  But that conclusion rested on three factual assertions, all of 
which required the court to ignore the price disconnect.  The court 
asserted that: 
 
(1) AstraZeneca added choices . . . [by] introduc[ing] a new drug to 
compete with already-established drugs . . . [;] 
(2) [D]etermin[ations of] which product among several is superior 
. . . are left to the marketplace[; and] 
(3) New products are not capable of affecting competitors’ market 
share unless consumers prefer the new product.40 
 
Each of those factual assertions contradicted plaintiffs’ allegations 
regarding the price disconnect and its effects.41  In a price-disconnected 
market, doctors’ switching prescriptions from an original branded 
product (facing impending generic competition) to a reformulated 
product (not facing generic competition)—what the court called 
“add[ing] choices”42—significantly impairs consumers’ ability to 
choose a generic product.  The “added choice” of the reformulated 
product is actually the means by which consumers’ real choice is 
eliminated.  In addition, the question should not be which product among 
several is superior, but rather which product offers the consumer the best 
trade-off between price and quality, a determination that “the 
marketplace” cannot make in a price-disconnected market.  In fact, when 
brands switch the market from the original to the reformulated version, 
they are capable of affecting competitors’ market shares despite 
consumers’ preferences because of the effects of significant promotion 
 
 37. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 38. Id. at 148-49. 
 39. Id. at 151. 
 40. Id. 
 41. First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial for Walgreen Co. at 8, 
Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 42. Walgreens, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 151. 
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and marketing.43  The court’s contrary assertion ignored not only the 
plaintiffs’ detailed allegations, but also the economic rationale of state 
substitution statutes and the Hatch-Waxman Act.  None of those statutes 
would be necessary if consumers in fact revealed their preferences 
through price/quality choices. 
D. Size of generic 
A final approach based on simplicity focuses on the size of the 
generic company.  One example is presented by the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott (Doryx).44  In that 
case, Warner Chilcott engaged in an array of concerning behaviors: it 
stopped selling capsule versions of acne-treating Doryx to wholesalers; 
removed Doryx capsules from its website; worked with retailers to 
“auto-reference” the Doryx tablet whenever a doctor filed a Doryx 
prescription; informed wholesalers, retailers, and dealers that “Doryx 
Capsules have been replaced by Doryx Tablets”; and bought back and 
destroyed capsule inventory.45  The Third Circuit nonetheless rejected 
Mylan’s claims of anticompetitive conduct, finding that “Mylan was not 
foreclosed from the market.”46  Even though it found, “viewing the facts 
in the light most favorable to Mylan, that defendants had indeed made 
the Doryx ‘hops’ primarily to ‘delay generic market entry,” it affirmed 
summary judgment for the defendants.47 
After concluding that the plaintiff—the competitor generic 
manufacturer—failed to adduce evidence of monopoly power, the court 
indicated that it would have affirmed summary judgment on the 
alternative ground that the plaintiff failed to satisfy its initial burden of 
introducing evidence of an anticompetitive effect under the Rule of 
Reason.48  The court, however, never explained what it considered to be 
an anticompetitive effect.  Nor did it consider whether a substantial 
reduction in the prescription base available for automatic generic 
substitution would count.  Instead, in direct opposition to the Supreme 
Court’s instruction that the relevant effect is on consumers, not 
 
 43. E.g., STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 87-93 
(2d ed. 2007) (doctors are subject to “a vast array of drug promotion, which includes detailing 
(sales calls to doctor’s offices), direct mailings, free drug samples, medical journal 
advertising, sponsored continuing medical education programs, and media advertising”). 
 44. 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 45. Id. at 429. 
 46. Id. at 438. 
 47. Id. at 431 (quotation omitted). 
 48. Id. at 438. 
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competitors,49 the court focused exclusively on the effect of Warner 
Chilcott’s conduct on Mylan, the generic competitor, never even 
mentioning the effect on consumers.50 
Regarding the product hops’ effects on Mylan (and assuming this 
were an appropriate inquiry), the court offered only a series of non-
sequiturs, asserting that Warner Chilcott’s conduct was not 
anticompetitive because: 
 
(1) Mylan received a 180-day exclusivity period under the Hatch-
Waxman Act (although Mylan’s sales at relatively high generic prices 
are irrelevant to whether Warner Chilcott substantially reduced the 
number of sales and profits that Mylan would have made absent the 
product hop)51; 
(2) Mylan set its generic price higher than the brand price for a 
period of time (although the court failed to explain the relevance of this 
fact and did not consider whether the product hop caused Mylan’s 
pricing strategy, as a generic unable to distribute its product through 
automatic substitution could increase the price for the sales it can 
make)52; and 
(3) Mylan made profits of $146.9 million on the sales of generic 
Doryx (although that number does not mean much unless compared to 
the profits that Mylan would have made absent the product hops).53 
 
In short, the court focused on Mylan’s status as a “Goliath” 
competitor, taking its eye off the ball of what should have been the goal: 
the consumer. 
III. SISYPHUS 
Quick.  Don’t think of a patented blue elephant.  What do you think 
of?  Well, a patented blue elephant, of course. (Assuming you’re not 
wondering how a blue elephant could be patented.)  Brand firms have an 
array of patented blue elephants they can parade before courts.  In other 
words, brand firms defend their behavior by offering plausible-sounding 
arguments that sometimes are difficult for courts to dislodge from their 
analysis. 
 
 49. Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting 
that Supreme Court in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977), held 
that “antitrust laws protect consumers, not competitors”). 
 50. Doryx, 838 F.3d at 439. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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Brand firms offer not only arguments that sound legitimate on their 
face but also frameworks that create enough uncertainty that they are 
significantly more likely to win.  The mythological figure Sisyphus 
labored to push a boulder uphill.  But the progress he achieved in inching 
the boulder uphill was quickly followed by the boulder rolling back 
downhill.54  So too do courts feel the pressure to let the boulder roll 
downhill when they are confronted with arguments difficult for plaintiffs 
to disprove.  This section discusses eight of these hurdles, focusing on 
arguments based on safety, product liability, immunity, innovation, the 
scope of the patent, risk aversion, patent validity, and assisting rivals. 
A. REMS: Safety 
The first challenge stems from brands’ claims that they should not 
be forced to share samples of their drugs with generics because of safety 
concerns.  The context in which this has most frequently arisen involves 
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) programs.55  
Pursuant to legislation enacted in 2007, the FDA requires REMS when 
a drug’s risks (such as death or injury) outweigh its rewards.56  Brands 
have used this regime, intended to bring drugs to the market, to block 
generic competition. 
Brands have claimed that they should not be compelled to share 
their samples with generics because of safety concerns.  For example, 
Celgene contended that the sale of samples imposed safety concerns as 
the “ingestion of . . . two teratogenic drugs [which produce birth defects] 
by unknown, healthy subjects entails risk of fetal exposure, which is why 
Mylan discusses its safety measures at length” and Celgene “need not 
accept  others’ conclusions that . . . these measures are adequate.”57  In a 
different case, Celgene “question[ed] the efficacy” of the generic’s 
“study protocol’s safety.”58  And Actelion explained that it “has an 
obvious and legitimate commercial interest to make sure that its liability, 
 
 54. Sisyphus, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sisyphus (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 55. Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), F.D.A., 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-and-availability/risk-evaluation-and-mitigation-
strategies-rems (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 56. U.S. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355-1(a)(1). 
 57. Brief in Support of Defendant Celgene Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, Mylan 
Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-cv-02094-ES-MAH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182222, 
at *17 (D.N.J. May 25, 2014). 
 58. Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 WL 1193912, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
29, 2011). 
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reputational issues, and concerns are taken into account and are dealt 
with.”59 
The problem is that brands’ concerns that a generic’s use of samples 
automatically poses a heightened risk for which they would be 
responsible are misplaced.  Use does not occur in a vacuum.  The FDA 
ensures the safety of not only brand drugs but also generics.  The agency 
tightly regulates the use of samples, including through clinical trials.60  
As a generic official has explained, “merely having a sample doesn’t 
mean a company has unfettered discretion to use it improperly, to have 
poor clinical trials, [or] to expose their employees to risk” since the FDA 
“continues to monitor what happens to that sample.”61  An attorney for 
generic company Roxane explained that generics “have been buying 
samples and using them for years and years and years, of both REMS-
covered and non-REMS-covered drugs, and there has never been some 
parade of horribles in terms of a brand being forced to come in and 
monitor what we’re doing.”62  Finally, safety concerns are significantly 
reduced when the samples are used for lab testing rather than on 
humans63 or (showing the illusory nature of such concerns) when brands 
provide samples to noncompeting research organizations.64 
B. REMS: Product liability 
Brand firms also have defended their refusal to provide samples to 
generics on the grounds of product liability.  Celgene, for example, has 
contended that its sale of samples would impose heightened risks, stating 
that it “would face increased exposure to products liability suits for sales 
to generic . . . filers,” as “[s]ome courts have accepted the notion that a 
branded drug manufacturer may be liable for injuries caused by the 
generic drug it did not sell.”65  Celgene also worried that “Mylan makes 
lengthy allegations regarding its willingness to indemnify Celgene” 
while noting that “Celgene is not required to accept these risks even with 
indemnification.”66  In a separate case, Celgene complained that a 
 
 59. Transcript of Motions Hearing at 100, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., Civil 
Action No. 1:12-cv-05743 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2013), ECF No. 93. 
 60. CREATES Act: Ending Regulatory Abuse, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring 
Drug Price Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, Policy & 
Consumer Rights, S. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong., at 1:49:11 (testimony of Beth Zelnick 
Kaufman), https://www.c-span.org/video/?411609-1/creates-act-ending-regulatory-abuse-
protecting-consumers-ensuring-drug-price-competition. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Actelion Transcript, supra note 59, at 65. 
 63. Id. at 58. 
 64. Id. at 110. 
 65. Celgene Brief, supra note 57, at 17. 
 66. Id. 
626 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
proposed generic insurance policy “has inadequate limits of liability and 
does not cover human clinical trials.”67 
Most fundamentally, such claims are not consistent with the Hatch-
Waxman Act, the relevant regulatory regime that the Supreme Court 
made clear in Verizon Communications v. Trinko that antitrust must be 
“attuned to” and take “careful account” of.68  Generic access to samples 
during the patent term was an essential aspect of the regime, allowing 
generics to avoid replicating clinical studies.69  Allowing brands to deny 
samples based on product-liability (or safety) justifications would 
undermine the carefully balanced tradeoff between competition and 
innovation at the heart of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
If there were any question remaining as to brands’ concerns with 
product liability, it would be dispelled by brands’ refusals to accept 
generics’ proposals to indemnify them for product liability claims.  
Similar to insurance and self-insurance, generic indemnification can 
serve a vital role in managing brand risk.  But the cases reveal brands’ 
lack of interest in such risk management. 
In Mylan v. Celgene, for example, Mylan agreed, over the course 
of a five-year negotiation for the sale of Thalomid, to indemnify Celgene 
for liability resulting from Mylan’s studies.70  Even at the time of this 
essay, eleven years after the parties signed an indemnification agreement 
in April 2009, the sale has not yet occurred. And for the sale of Revlimid, 
Mylan offered Celgene an executed indemnification agreement and 
alleged that it “requested the purchase of limited Revlimid samples for 
bioequivalence testing, offering to pay market value,” to which Celgene 
responded with a “voluminous information request” and rejection of 
“Mylan’s offer to enter into an indemnification agreement, which 
included nearly every concession to terms Celgene requested” during 
earlier negotiations on Thalomid.71 
C. Citizen petitions: Immunity 
A third argument brand firms have advanced stems from claims that 
the citizen petitions they file are immune as a type of petitioning conduct.  
Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, “[t]hose who petition [the] 
 
 67. Lannett, 2011 WL 1193912, at *2. 
 68. 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004). 
 69. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 42-43 (2009). 
 70. Transcript of Oral Opinion at 6, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094-
ES (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2014), ECF No. 54. 
 71. Plaintiff Mylan Pharms.’ Brief in Opposition to Celgene’s Motion to Dismiss at *10, 
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., Civ. Action No. 2:14-cv-02094-ES-MAH, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1435 (D.N.J. June 16, 2014). 
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government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability.”72  
This doctrine, however, contains a well-established exception for sham 
conduct.  Even in Noerr itself, the Supreme Court cautioned that 
petitioning behavior could lose its protection if it were a “sham to cover 
what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with 
the business relationships of a competitor[.]”73  Since the Noerr decision, 
the Supreme Court has applied the exception to misrepresentations made 
to courts and administrative agencies,74 including patent-infringement 
suits based on a patent obtained through fraud.75 
Many citizen petitions are questionable.  Even though they are 
meant to raise legitimate safety concerns with the FDA, my empirical 
research found that the FDA has denied nearly all of the petitions.  In 
particular, I found that the FDA denied 92% of petitions targeting 
generic entry, with that figure rising to 98% for petitions filed at the “last 
minute,” within six months of the expiration of a patent or FDA 
exclusivity period.76 
In addition to these general findings, particular examples 
demonstrate concern in the form of: 
 
• Multiple petitions (such as Teva’s 8 petitions on MS-treating 
Copaxone and Shire Viropharma’s 24 petitions on a life-
threatening gastrointestinal infection)77; 
• Late-filed petitions (such as Bayer Healthcare filing a 
petition one day before the expiration of the patent on 
Mirena, a long-acting intrauterine device (IUD))78; 
• The combination of citizen petitions and product hopping 
(as shown by acne-treating Doryx)79; and 
 
 72. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993); 
see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference 
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136, 140-41 (1961). 
 73. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. 
 74. E.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972). 
 75. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77 
(1965). 
 76. Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and at-Last 
Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 308, 323 (2016). 
 77. Id. at 344-46; see generally Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, 
FTC v. Shire ViroPharma Inc., (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2017); FTC v. Shire ViroPharma Inc., 917 
F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 78. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 76, at 346-47. 
 79. Id. at 347-49. 
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• The combination of petitions and entry-delaying settlements 
(as shown by Mylan’s allergic-emergency-treating 
EpiPen).80 
 
The FDA has also voiced unease with this conduct.  In seeking to 
invigorate its ability to summarily deny petitions submitted “with the 
primary purpose of delaying” generic approval, the agency introduced a 
draft guidance articulating relevant factors, which included long-delayed 
petitions, repetitive petitions, submissions immediately before generic 
approval, petitions without support, and a history of concerning 
petitions.81 
In short, any attempted defense based on petitioning immunity runs 
headlong into the sham nature of petitions that are almost always denied 
and that often raise significant concerns of delayed generic competition, 
which directly harms consumers by increasing price. 
D. Product hopping: Innovation 
The fourth argument is based on innovation.  Innovation is a core 
American value, like baseball and apple pie.  So, when brand firms (and 
commentators supporting them) claim that their behavior is needed for 
innovation, it is difficult for courts to resist the spell.  One setting in 
which the issue arises involves “product hopping.” 
Two respected commentators, Joshua Wright, a former 
Commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Judge 
Douglas Ginsburg, a Senior Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, have offered the most thorough argument for why 
innovation should receive deference and antitrust liability is not 
appropriate for product hopping.82  The authors worry that “applying a 
standard competition law analysis is likely to deter innovation that would 
have benefitted consumers.”83  They contend that “innovations, 
 
 80. Id. at 350-51; Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, The Untold EpiPen Story: 
How Mylan Hiked Prices by Blocking Rivals, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 53, 64-66 (2017). 
 81. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., FDA, Citizen Petitions and Petitions for 
Stay of Action Subject to Section 505(q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: 
Guidance for Industry, at 16, Oct. 2018, 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/UCM622235.pdf. 
 82. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comment on the Canadian Competition 
Bureau’s Draft Updated Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines 2 (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/734661/150810canadacomm
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 83. Id. 
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including even small changes in product design, can generate significant 
consumer benefits.”84 
The authors claim that “[c]ompetition law is not a suitable 
instrument for micromanaging product design and innovation” as it 
“requires competition agencies and courts to weigh the benefits to 
consumers from the innovation against any costs to consumers arising 
from the diminution of competition.”85  The agencies and courts are “ill-
equipped” to make these determinations, and it is “unclear” whether such 
a balancing “can be done at all.”86 
The authors trust not the antitrust agencies but the “judgment [of] 
the value of product design changes levied by consumers in the 
market.”87  The apparent problem of applying antitrust law is that 
agencies and courts would be “substituting their judgment for the 
judgment made by consumers.”88  The authors claim that subjecting drug 
reformulations to antitrust scrutiny “most remarkably assumes that 
pharmaceutical markets are somehow so different from other product 
markets that producers are free to ignore consumer judgments about the 
value of product innovations.”89 
In contrast to these assertions, however, no empirical or other 
evidence suggests that a well-structured antitrust analysis would deter 
innovation in this setting.90  For the subset of potentially anticompetitive 
reformulations, antitrust scrutiny is likely not to deter innovation, but to 
spur it.  Brand firms often withhold incremental innovations from the 
market to use them later as part of a product hop.91  For example, 
manufacturers in one case sought approval for a new treatment in 
connection with a reformulation even though “[t]he data necessary to get 
the new indication was available much earlier.”92  Similarly, in a second 
case involving criminal liability for promoting off-label uses of a 
 
 84. Id. at 2. See also Mylan Pharms. v. Warner Chilcott, 838 F.3d 421, 440 (3d Cir. 2016) 
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seizure-treating drug, the brand firm conceded that a “principal reason 
for not seeking FDA approval for those uses was that it wanted to reserve 
them for a later promotional campaign for its reformulated product.”93  
And in the last case, the brand firm waited until generic competition for 
the twice-daily drug was imminent before introducing the once-daily 
version, even though “[a]ll other . . . disease treatments are administered 
once a day.”94  It is telling that in this case, the brand firm had obtained 
FDA approval to market the once-daily version three years earlier but 
had withheld it from the market until entry of the twice-daily generics 
was looming.95 
Limiting antitrust scrutiny of product hopping to “sham 
innovations” is a recipe for anticompetitive behavior in complex markets 
that would have dramatic effects on consumers.  At the same time, the 
talisman of “innovation” is difficult for courts to resist.  As a result, 
courts could apply an excessively deferential approach that allows 
product hops that make no sense other than delaying generic entry. 
E. Scope of patent 
In the settlement context, the first—and perhaps most 
fundamental—boulder running downhill involves the “scope” of the 
patent.  Between 2005 and 2012, courts upheld reverse-payment 
settlements that allowed generic entry (even with payment) at or before 
the end of the patent term.  The Ciprofloxacin court found that “[t]he 
essence of the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition 
beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.”96  The Schering-Plough 
court similarly concluded that reverse payments were “within the 
patent’s exclusionary power.”97  The Tamoxifen court found that the 
settlement did not “unlawfully extend the reach” of the patent.98  And 
the court in Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals sought to achieve 
“[a] suitable accommodation between antitrust law’s free competition 
requirement and the patent regime’s incentive system” by immunizing 
activity within the patent’s scope.99 
The Court in Actavis correctly rejected the scope test, 
understanding that “[t]he patent . . . may or may not be valid, and may 
or may not be infringed” but that “an invalidated patent carries with it 
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 95. Id. at 647-48. 
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213 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 99. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003). 
2020] THREE CHALLENGES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL ANTITRUST 631 
no . . . right . . . [to] permit the patent owner to charge a higher than 
competitive price for the patented product.”100  Importantly, the Court 
made it clear that the relevant question was not merely what rights patent 
law would have conferred.  It concluded that “[i]t would be incongruous 
to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s 
anticompetitive effects solely against patent policy, rather than by 
measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.”101  
Rather, both antitrust and patent policies were relevant to determining 
the proper “scope of the patent monopoly—and consequently antitrust 
immunity—that is conferred by a patent,” as “[w]hether a particular 
restraint lies beyond the limits of the patent monopoly is a conclusion 
that flows from [traditional antitrust] analysis and not . . . its starting 
point.”102 
It thus would have appeared clear after Actavis that the scope-of-
the-patent argument was no longer an effective justification that the 
settling parties could rely on.  But the difficulties of finally burying this 
argument are revealed by the lure of the claim that generic entry before 
patent expiration is procompetitive.  On its face, and with Actavis 
receding ever further into the rearview mirror, courts are tempted to find 
that pre-expiration entry provides “extra” competition that is good for 
the consumer.  As discussed immediately below, an FTC Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) and a district court took this bait. 
In In the Matter of Impax Laboratories, the ALJ concluded that it 
was “procompetitive” for a settlement to permit a generic “to enter the 
market eight months before the original patents expired.”103  Such entry 
allowed “consumers [to] benefit[] . . . by having uninterrupted and 
continuous access” to the generic, with this “product on the market and 
available to consumers today” because the generic “had the foresight to 
negotiate licenses to future patents.”104  The ALJ stated that entry before 
the end of the patent term “can be considered in assessing the 
[settlement’s] competitive consequences.”105  And the ALJ even 
downplayed the anticompetitive harm at the heart of Actavis by claiming 
that “the magnitude or extent of such harm is largely theoretical, based 
on an inference” that the generic’s entry date would have been earlier 
without the reverse payment, and that this theoretical harm was 
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outweighed by “the . . . substantial . . . real world procompetitive 
benefits” of the settlement.106 
A similar ruling occurred in the context of a generic’s 
underpayment for products provided by the brand firm.  In that case, the 
FTC claimed that Abbott (AbbVie’s parent company) paid Teva to delay 
entering the market with a generic version of testosterone gel AndroGel 
by providing Teva with an authorized generic version of cholesterol drug 
TriCor at “a price that is well below what is customary in such 
situations.”107  In granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, however, the 
court failed to recognize a potential payment, formalistically finding that 
“the AbbVie Defendants are not making any payments to Teva,” but “[i]t 
is Teva which is paying Abbott for the supply of TriCor.”108  The court 
recognized that “the FTC correctly alleges that something of large value 
passed from Abbott to Teva,” but erred in concluding that “it was not a 
reverse payment under Actavis.”109 
The court then compounded its error in insufficiently recognizing 
payment by linking it to the scope-of-the-patent test.  Not recognizing 
that the patent could have been invalid or not infringed, the court praised 
the agreement’s “allow[ing] Teva to enter the AndroGel market almost 
six years prior to the expiration of the ‘894 Patent.’” 110  The court 
viewed this as “an early entry date into the AndroGel market.”111  And 
the court considered the separate agreement involving TriCor as 
“procompetitive” since it “allows Teva to enter the cholesterol drug 
market with a generic product to compete with Abbott’s product and thus 
advantage the purchasers of cholesterol drugs.”112 
In short, the Impax and TriCor rulings are examples of courts 
applying the scope-of-the-patent test unequivocally rejected in Actavis.  
Generic entry before the end of the patent term is procompetitive only if 
the patent is valid and infringed.  But whether there is a valid, infringed 
patent is precisely the inquiry short-circuited when a brand pays a 
generic to drop its patent challenge.  And given that 89% of patents in 
settled litigation cover not the active ingredient but only ancillary aspects 
(with the majority of these patents ultimately overturned113), the revival 
of the scope test threatens significant harms. 
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F. Settlements: Risk aversion 
Another boulder in the settlement context involves brands’ 
justifications for settlement based on an aversion to risk, in other words, 
an attempt to avoid the chance that the patent would be declared invalid 
or not infringed.  Such an argument, however, can only be considered in 
the context of the Actavis decision, in particular its emphasis on the 
instructive role played by payment.  The Court in Actavis found that the 
settlement at issue had the “potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition” since “payment in return for staying out of the market . . .  
keeps prices at patentee-set levels.”114  In addition, the Court highlighted 
the harms from a payment to a generic, which “in effect amounts to a 
purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product, a right 
it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to continue 
and the patent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic 
product.”115 
The Court revealed its strong preference for determining patent 
strength by examining the payment rather than the patent.  The “size of 
the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a 
patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed 
exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”116  Even strong patents 
(i.e., those covering the active ingredient) are not immune from the 
concern with payments, as an unexplained payment on a “particularly 
valuable patent . . . likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition,” with 
this consequence “constitut[ing] the relevant anticompetitive harm.”117  
In other words, the Court made clear that risk aversion was not an 
acceptable justification for a reverse-payment settlement. 
In identifying the avoidance of the risk of competition as an 
antitrust violation, the Court dispensed with the “risk aversion” defense 
long advocated by settling parties (and economists), including in Actavis 
itself.  For example, in Actavis, a group of economists filed an amicus 
brief that asserted that reverse payments “may . . . be necessary for brand 
companies to overcome bargaining disadvantages caused by risk 
aversion.”118  The brief also stated that “[b]rand companies are likely to 
be more risk averse than their generic challengers because they usually 
have significantly more to lose from a negative trial outcome.”119  And 
it contended that “the size of a reverse payment generally does not 
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provide a reliable benchmark to determine whether the payment is 
anticompetitive.”120  Faced squarely with these justifications, the Court 
refused to accept them.121 
But the power of the risk aversion argument is that the argument 
keeps rolling down the mountain to the case law.  This is remarkable 
given that the Supreme Court pushed that boulder uphill, correctly 
recognizing that reverse-payment settlements prevent the risk that a 
patent will be invalidated or found to be not infringed. 
In direct contravention of Actavis, the Third Circuit in In re 
Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation was “persuaded” by an economists’ 
amicus brief that “explains why risk aversion makes it difficult to use 
the size of a settlement as a proxy for the brand-name’s likelihood of 
success in litigation.”122  The court even found that this reasoning (which 
the Supreme Court rejected in calling the “prevent[ion of] the risk of 
competition” the “relevant anticompetitive harm”123) “serves as an 
effective rebuttal to the [plaintiffs’] claim that the size of the reverse 
payment is a ‘surrogate’ ”  for patent weakness.124  The Third Circuit 
seemed not to understand that a risk-aversion defense could be raised in 
literally every case to justify a payment of any amount, no matter how 
weak the patent, which would essentially immunize reverse-payment 
settlements. 
G. Settlements: Patent invalidity 
A final challenge in the settlement context involves patent 
invalidity in the determination of causation.  The plaintiff in Actavis was 
the Federal Trade Commission.  As a government agency, the FTC does 
not need to demonstrate causation because it automatically has 
standing.125  In contrast, private plaintiffs need to make such a 
showing.126  And some courts have required plaintiffs to “prove precisely 
how, absent the illegal settlement agreement, generic entry would have 
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happened earlier.”127  Plaintiffs have pursued three paths to showing this: 
patent litigation resulting in a finding of invalidity or noninfringement, 
generic entry “at risk” (before a court has issued a finding that the patent 
is invalid or not infringed) during the patent litigation, and a settlement 
without payment allowing earlier entry.128  Courts applying a rigid 
approach to causation require plaintiffs to select among these paths and 
“prove specifically how entry would have occurred in the absence of the 
illegal settlement agreement.”129 
One example was provided by the only trial on a reverse-payment 
settlement since Actavis, in which the jury issued a verdict for the 
defendants.  The jury found that AstraZeneca had exercised market 
power, that the settlement included a “large and unjustified payment,” 
and that it was “unreasonably anticompetitive.”130  But despite all of this, 
the jury found that “[h]ad it not been for” the settlement, AstraZeneca 
would not have “agreed with Ranbaxy that Ranbaxy might launch a 
generic version of Nexium before May 27, 2014.”131  The court had 
earlier raised concerns related to the plaintiffs’ ability to show causation, 
given the failure to offer “direct evidence that the FDA was likely to 
grant final approval to Ranbaxy’s generic Nexium product within the 
proposed timeline,” as well as evidence that Ranbaxy would “never” 
have launched generic Nexium at risk.132  In upholding the verdict, the 
First Circuit found that “the district court saw no evidence that would 
allow the plaintiffs to overcome the likelihood that [the brand firm’s] 
patents, not its reverse payment . . . , were the bar to a generic launch.”133  
The court concluded that the district court “did not err by requiring some 
evidence of the patents’ invalidity or noninfringement before allowing 
the plaintiffs to pursue an at-risk launch theory.”134 
Similarly, in In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, the Third 
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the generic would have 
launched at risk since this did not “take into account [a] blocking 
patent.”135  The court stated that the plaintiffs were required to “show 
that the launch would have been legal” because “if the launch were 
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stopped because it was illegal,” then the plaintiffs’ injury “would be 
caused not by the settlement but by the patent laws prohibiting the 
launch.”136 
The Third Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ “litigation-based 
scenario” by which the generic would have prevailed in patent litigation.  
Downplaying Actavis and drawing curious distinctions, the court 
asserted that “[w]hile the size of the reverse payment may have some 
relevance in determining how confident a litigant is in the strength of its 
case,” it “is far from dispositive,” especially where “the settlement is 
complex and multi-faceted” and “there are multiple plausible ways to 
interpret the reverse payment.”137 
In short, some courts have imposed causation as a Sisyphean hurdle 
for plaintiffs, one that (in requiring plaintiffs to prove that the patent 
definitively would have been ruled invalid) is nearly impossible to prove 
and that flies in the face of the Court’s direction in Actavis that patent 
validity need not be litigated. 
H. Duties to deal 
The final issue involves duties to deal.  In the setting of denying 
samples generics need to enter the market pursuant to REMS programs, 
brand firms have claimed they have no duty to deal with rivals.  For 
example, Actelion contended that it “is under no duty to deal with or 
assist its would-be generic competitors,” as the “well-settled rule of law 
is subject to narrow and rare exceptions, none of which applies” to the 
denial of samples.138  Speaking even more broadly, Actelion asserted that 
“[t]his right to choose with whom to do business—and to choose not to 
do business with a rival—is a cornerstone of America’s free enterprise 
system, and is consistent with basic free market principles.”139  
Continuing the theme of hyperbole, Celgene asserted that even if its 
“insistence on appropriate procedures and guarantees were not 
motivated by the safety of fetuses and the survival of its business, 
antitrust law still would not require it to deal with its potential rivals.”140 
To be sure, the Court in Trinko was skeptical of refusal-to-deal 
cases, stating that “as a general matter, the Sherman Act ‘does not restrict 
the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 168. 
 138. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
and to Dismiss Counterclaims at 2, Actelion Pharms. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc. (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 
2012) (Civ. 1:12-cv-05743), ECF No. 44-1. 
 139. Id. at 12. 
 140. Brief in Support of Defendant Celgene Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
57, at 4. 
2020] THREE CHALLENGES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL ANTITRUST 637 
entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent 
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’ ” 141  On the other hand, 
the “high value” that the Court “placed on the right to refuse to deal with 
other firms does not mean that the right is unqualified.”142  The Court 
explained that “[u]nder certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with 
rivals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate [Section] 2.”143  
While there might not be a general duty to deal in many contexts, several 
factors presented by the combination of the unique pharmaceutical 
regulatory setting and conduct that makes no sense other than by 
harming a rival suggest an exception for REMS behavior. 
First, the facts of REMS sample denials, with readily-available 
samples, resemble those cases in which the Supreme Court has found 
liability.  The Court in Trinko found that the defendants in the cases of 
Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing144 and Otter Tail Power v. 
United States,145 should have offered ski lift tickets and power 
transmission, respectively, which were already available to the public.146  
For REMS programs that the FDA requires after the drug is already on 
the market, by definition the product is available.  And even when a 
sample is requested before approval, the brand is in the business of 
producing drugs and the provision of a sample after the drug is 
manufactured does not require additional effort. 
Second, the REMS-related conduct makes no economic sense 
absent the impairment of generic competition.  Generics have been 
willing to pay a high price for samples, with one even stating that it pays 
“ridiculous amounts of money” for “a commercially immaterial quantity 
of drug.”147  The caselaw provides examples of generics’ willingness to 
purchase samples at a rate that would be profitable to the brand.148 
The Court in Aspen Skiing found exclusionary conduct where a 
defendant was “willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer 
goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller 
rival.”149  In contrast, the Trinko Court denied liability where Verizon 
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could obtain only a “cost-based rate of compensation”150 from sharing 
its network with rivals.  Brands refusing to sell samples lose the 
opportunity to obtain at least a market (and sometimes significantly 
higher) price for samples. 
Third is the ineffectiveness of the regulatory regime.  The Trinko 
Court underscored the importance of regulation (and lack of a need for 
antitrust enforcement) in the setting of the Telecommunications Act, 
which was effectively enforced through financial penalties, daily or 
weekly reporting requirements, and the suspension or revocation of 
long-distance approval.151  In contrast, antitrust regulation is needed in 
this setting given that the REMS regime is not working as intended, with 
the FDA unable to fix the problem and eager to punt competition issues 
to the FTC.152 
To date, this is one area where courts have appropriately 
appreciated the role of antitrust liability.  In distinguishing the sample-
denial setting from Trinko, the court in Actelion v. Apotex explained that 
the Supreme Court’s refusal-to-deal decisions were “fact-specific’ and 
“industry-specific” and made clear that the FDA “d[id] not have the 
regulatory power to compel samples” and that “there [was] no other 
potential remedy to a defendant suffering anticompetitive conduct in that 
regulatory scheme.”153  As a result, the court correctly found that 
antitrust regulation was appropriate.  In addition, the Mylan v. Celgene 
court found that Third Circuit cases had found prior dealing between the 
parties to be “relevant but not dispositive” in determining whether a duty 
to deal applies.154 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts confronting pharmaceutical antitrust law issues face 
significant challenges. The issues are complex.  The courts yearn for 
simplicity.  And the defendants erect Sisyphean hurdles in the form of 
facially reasonable arguments related to safety, innovation, and patents 
that plaintiffs must rebut.  As issues of drug pricing become more 
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prominent and the conduct described in this essay shows no signs of 
abating, it is worth remembering the challenges confronting courts. 
